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Abstract In this paper, we explore the rela-
tionship between the topological characteristics of a
complex network and its robustness to sustained tar-
geted attacks. Using synthesised scale-free, small-
world and random networks, we look at a number of
network measures, including assortativity, modular-
ity, average path length, clustering coefficient, rich
club profiles and scale-free exponent (where appli-
cable) of a network, and how each of these influence
the robustness of a network under targeted attacks.
We use an established robustness coefficient to mea-
sure topological robustness, and consider sustained
targeted attacks by order of node degree. With re-
spect to scale-free networks, we show that assortativ-
ity, modularity and average path length have a pos-
itive correlation with network robustness, whereas
clustering coefficient has a negative correlation. We
did not find any correlation between scale-free ex-
ponent and robustness, or rich-club profiles and ro-
bustness. The robustness of small-world networks
on the other hand, show substantial positive correla-
tions with assortativity, modularity, clustering coef-
ficient and average path length. In comparison, the
robustness of Erdos-Renyi random networks did not
have any significant correlation with any of the net-
work properties considered. A significant observa-
tion is that high clustering decreases topological ro-
bustness in scale-free networks, yet it increases topo-
logical robustness in small-world networks. Our re-
sults highlight the importance of topological charac-
teristics in influencing network robustness, and illus-
trate design strategies network designers can use to
increase the robustness of scale-free and small-world
networks under sustained targeted attacks.
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1 Introduction
The study of complex networks has been one of
the dominant trends in scientific research in the last
decade [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Scientists from areas
as diverse as physics and computer science, math-
ematics and biology, chemistry and social science
have been interested in analysing complex networks
in their respective fields and find common features
between them. A number of topological metrics have
been proposed to understand the structure of a com-
plex network: these include modularity, assortativ-
ity, information content, network diameter, and clus-
tering coefficient among others [1, 3, 4, 9]. Mean-
while, researchers have also been interested in the
functional features of networks, including their func-
tional motifs, the routing and sharing of information
over them, and how they respond to random or tar-
geted attacks.
It has been shown that the ability of a network to
maintain its integrity under node failures or attacks
depends heavily on its topological structure. For ex-
ample, scale-free networks are more resilient against
random attacks, but more vulnerable to targeted at-
tacks, compared to Erdos-Renyi random networks
[10]. It can be immediately seen that quantifying
such resilience (robustness) of a network is vital in
a number of disciplines. For example, computer net-
works should be designed in such a way that they
should function properly when some nodes (routers
or hosts) fail, by technical faults or under attack. On
the other hand, in a network of terrorist cells, we
might be interested in the best strategy to attack the
network so that it is disabled and disintegrated as
quickly as possible. Therefore, measuring and com-
paring the robustness of networks under various fail-
ure and attack scenarios is of vital importance.
Since network robustness depends on its topol-
ogy, there must be quantifiable relationships between
topological metrics and the robustness of a network.
In this paper, we discuss the relationship of a partic-
ular type of robustness measure to a number of topo-
logical parameters. The robustness measure is cho-
sen such that it is applicable to sustained targeted at-
tacks which follow a particular algorithm or pattern.
In particular, we consider the topological features of
a range of scale-free, small-world and random net-
works, analysing how each feature affects the robust-
ness of each type of network.
The rest of the paper is arranged in the following
manner: We will first introduce the network metrics
that we will be using to quantify the topological fea-
tures of a network. Then we will present the robust-
ness metric that we will be using to quantify a net-
work’s robustness under sustained targeted attacks.
In the following sections, we will present our sim-
ulation results and analyse them. Finally, we will
present our conclusions.
2 Background
Scale-free networks: Scale-free networks are those
networks that display similar topological features ir-
respective of scale [1, 5]. Such networks are de-
scribed by power law degree distributions, formally
specified as
pk = Ak−γU(k/kmax) (1)
U is a step function specifying a cut off at k= kmax.
The degree distribution of scale-free networks can be
specified by a number of parameters, including max-
imum degree kmax, scale-free exponent γ, proportion
of out-lier nodes A, and average degree ¯k. How-
ever, it can be shown that there are only two inde-
pendent parameters and the others could be derived
from these.
Scale-free networks are impressively robust to
random node failure and random damage [3, 10]. To
destroy or fragment such networks randomly, one
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would have to remove almost all of its nodes [3].
This perhaps explains, at least partly, why scale-free
architecture is commonly found in many evolved
networks in nature. This also means that targeted at-
tacks have to be designed specifically to effectively
destroy such networks, and non-trivial topological
analysis of the network is necessary to identify the
nodes to be targeted.
Indeed, most real-world networks are scale-free
networks, including technical, biological and social
networks [11, 12, 13, 14, 3, 15, 5]. It is possible
in some directed networks that the in-degree distri-
bution is scale-free but the out-degree distribution is
not, or vice versa. For example, the in-degree dis-
tributions of some transcription networks are scale-
free, while the out-degree distributions are exponen-
tial [2]. There are a number of growth models which
generate scale-free networks, and prominent among
them is the Barabasi-Albert model [1].
Small-world networks: The small-world net-
work model indicates that despite the large network
size, the average distance between two arbitrary
nodes remain relatively low. The main characteris-
tics that are used to identify a small-world network
are the relatively low average path length and the rel-
atively high clustering coefficient[5]. Indeed, many
real-world networks such as the collaboration net-
works have been shown to possess the small-world
nature. Although various models have been pro-
posed to produce small-world networks, the most
widely used one is the Watts-Strogatz model[16].
This is the model that we used to generate small-
world networks in this work. Small-world networks
too have been demonstrated to be robust against ran-
dom node and link failures[17].
Erdos-Renyi random networks: The Erdos-
Renyi random model[1] defines a random network
where N nodes are connected randomly by M possi-
ble links. When generating random networks based
on this model, we limited the total number of links,
to make sure that the resulting network would have
the predefined link to node ratio. Even though
such random networks were once used extensively
to model distributed systems, researchers have since
realised that most real world networks do not display
degree distributions similar to random networks [1].
Yet, random networks are often used as null models
to compare against other networks models, and we
use them for the same purpose in this work.
Now let us introduce the metrics we will use to
analyse the topology of a network.
Assortativity : Assortativity is the tendency ob-
served in networks where nodes mostly connect with
similar nodes. Typically, this similarity is interpreted
in terms of degrees of nodes. Assortativity has been
formally defined as a correlation function of excess
degree distributions and link distribution of a net-
work [18, 9]. The concepts of degree distribution
pk and excess degree distribution qk for undirected
networks are well known [9]. Given qk, one can in-
troduce the quantity e j,k as the joint probability dis-
tribution of the remaining degrees of the two nodes
at either end of a randomly chosen link. Given these
distributions, the assortativity of an undirected net-
work is defined as:
ρ = 1
σ2q
[
∑
jk
jk(e j,k−q jqk)
]
(2)
where σq is the standard deviation of qk. Assorta-
tivity distributions can be constructed by considering
the local assortativity values of all nodes in a network
[19, 20].
Modularity: Network modularity is the extent
to which a network can be separated into indepen-
dent sub-networks. Formally[2], modularity quanti-
fies the fraction of links that are within the respective
modules compared to all links in a network. [2] in-
troduces an algorithm which can partition a network
into k modules and measure the partitions modularity
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Q. The measure uses the concept that a good parti-
tion of a network should have a lot of within-module
links and a very small number of between-module
links. The modularity can be defined as:
Q = ∑ks=1
[
ls
L
−
(
ds
2L
)2]
, (3)
where k is the number of modules, L is the number
of links in the network, ls is the number of links be-
tween nodes in module s, and ds is the sum of de-
grees of nodes in module s. To avoid getting a single
module in all cases, this measure imposes Q = 0 if
all nodes are in the same module or nodes are placed
randomly into modules.
Clustering coefficient: The clustering coefficient
of a node characterizes the density of links in the en-
vironment closest to a node. Formally, the clustering
coefficient C of a node is the ratio between the total
number of y links connecting its neighbours and the
total number of all possible links between all these z
nearest neighbours [3]:
C = 2y
z(z−1)
(4)
The clustering coefficient C for a network is the av-
erage C over all nodes.
Average Path Length: The average path length
lG of a network is defined as the average length of
shortest paths between all pairs of nodes in that net-
work. For many real world networks, this average
path length is much smaller than the size of the net-
work, that is l ≪ N. Such networks are said to be
showing the small-world property [21, 22, 23].
lG =
1
n(n−1)∑i, j d (vi,v j) (5)
Equation 5 gives the formal definition of the
average path length of a network. Here d(vi,v j) is
the shortest path between the nodes vi and v j, and n
is the size of the network.
Rich club connectivity: A rich-club is defined in
terms of degree-based rank r of nodes, and the rich-
club connectivity ϕ(r). The degree-based rank de-
notes the rank of a given node when all nodes are
ordered in terms of their degrees, highest first. This
is then normalised by the total number of nodes. The
rich-club connectivity is defined as the ratio of actual
number of links over the maximum possible number
of links between nodes with rank less than r. Thus,
it is possible to calculate the rich-club connectivity
distribution of a network, ϕ(r) over r. Eq. 6 shows
the formal definition of the rich-club coefficient.
ϕ(r) = 2E(r)
r(r−1)
(6)
Here, E(r) is the number of links between the r
nodes and r(r − 1)/2 is the maximum number of
links that these nodes could have shared.
2.1 Topological robustness and robustness
coefficient
The ability of a network to sustain or withstand ran-
dom failures or targeted attacks depends on its topo-
logical structure. For example, scale-free networks
have been shown to be more resilient against random
failures, but are more vulnerable to targeted central-
ity based attacks, in comparison to Erdo¨s-Re´nyi ran-
dom networks[24]. Thus, it is important to observe
the topological robustness of a network to compre-
hend how its topological structure would contribute
to random node failures or targeted attacks.
There exists a substantial body of work which
introduces and analyses structural robustness mea-
sures. Albert et al. [10] considered error and at-
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tack tolerance of complex networks by comparing
the profiles of quantities such as the network diam-
eter and the size of the largest component. Follow-
ing their work, a multitude of metrics have been pro-
posed to measure the topological robustness of net-
works as a single quantity. However, they typically
calculate averaged effects of single node removals,
rather than effects of sequential removals, or are too
simplistic. For example, the network efficiency has
been defined as the average of inverted shortest path
lengths [25], and used for quantifying the robustness
of a network. Node removals are not explicitly con-
sidered in this measure. Similarly, Dekker and Col-
bert [26] introduced two concepts of connectivity for
a graph which can be used to model network robust-
ness: the node connectivity and link connectivity,
which are the smallest number of nodes and links re-
spectively, whose removal results in a disconnected
or single-node graph. In this work, we used the ro-
bustness coefficient introduced in Piraveenan et al.
[27] as the robustness measure as it has the advan-
tage of providing a single numeric value to quantify
the topological robustness of a network under sus-
tained attack.
The robustness coefficient R is defined (in percent-
age) as [27]:
R =
200∑Nk=0 Sk−100S0
N2
(7)
In Eq. 7, Sk is the size of the largest component
after k nodes are removed. S0 denotes the initial
largest component size. N is the network size. Ac-
cording to the above equation, for a fully connected
network of any size, the robustness coefficient (R)
would always be 100%. While we refer the inter-
ested reader to consult [27] for its derivation, it suf-
fices to say here that this is essentially an Area Under
Curve (AUC) measure, comparing the area under the
size of largest component curve with that of a fully
connected network of equivalent size. Similar Area
Under the Curve (AUC) measures are used in a num-
ber of disciplines. For example, in signal detection
theory, the area under a Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic (ROC) curve [28] denotes the probability that
a classifier will rank a randomly chosen positive in-
stance higher than a randomly chosen negative one,
and in mechanics, the area under curve of a velocity
vs time plot of a moving object denotes the distance
that it has travelled [29].
Let us note that the robustness coefficient is not
constant to a network, but depends on the type of at-
tack. In order to measure the robustness coefficient
under different types of attacks, the nodes that are re-
moved are selected based on their centrality values.
For example, in a betweenness based attack, the node
that would be removed in each iteration would be the
node with the highest betweenness centrality value,
at that particular instance of the network. Likewise,
the other centrality based attacks would select the
node with the highest value of the respective cen-
trality measure. In the case of a random attack, a
randomly selected node would be removed in each
iteration.
3 Simulation results
We used groups of 100 synthesised scale-free, small-
world and Erdos-Renyi random networks in our sim-
ulation experiments. The scale-free networks were
synthesized using a variant of the Preferential At-
tachment (PA) method, widely used as a model to
synthesize scale-free networks [1]. Each network
consisted of 1000 nodes. The network size was cho-
sen arbitrarily, while considering the computing time
that would be necessary to compute the properties of
a much larger network. We chose four different link-
to-node ratio (LNR) values, namely LNR = 2,3,4
and 5. These would correspond to average degree
values of ¯k = 4,6,8 and 10. We had twenty-five net-
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works with each LNR value in each group, and these
networks were different from each other in topologi-
cal characteristics such as scale-free exponent, mod-
ularity, clustering coefficient, assortativity, rich-club
profiles, and average path length.
In order to generate small-world networks, we fol-
lowed the Watts-Strogatz [16] model. According to
this model, initially a ring network with 1000 nodes
was generated. Then for each node, K number of
neighbours were connected on either side of the ring.
This results in a ring-lattice structure. Afterwards,
based on a probability p, one end of each link is dis-
connected and connected to a random node in the
ring. By varying p, we can vary a network between
a ring-lattice structure and a random network. Val-
ues around p = 0.5 generate small-world networks,
though the values of p were varied from 0.2 to 0.8
to achieve considerable variation in the topological
parameters. Erdos-Renyi random networks of equiv-
alent sizes and link-to-node ratios were generated,
by randomly selecting and linking pairs of nodes,
to compare their robustness and other network at-
tributes.
When attacking the networks, we used a degree
based attack. In other words, we removed the node
with the highest degree form the network, in each
iteration. When there are multiple nodes with the
highest degree, a randomly selected node out of
those is removed. In doing so, we assume that the
degrees of all nodes are known prior to the attack.
the choice of node degree as a node property to guide
the attack is justified because this is easy to obtain or
calculate and has been previously used to guide tar-
geted attacks (e.g. in [24]). All the robustness results
obtained are dependent on the type of attack used. If
a different type of attack was used, that would have
quantitatively affected the resulting robustness val-
ues.
We measured the robustness of each of these net-
works using the robustness metric described above.
The topological robustness is measured as a percent-
age and illustrates the network’s ability to withstand
sustained targeted node removal. We removed the
nodes in the order of node degree.
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Figure 1: Scale-free network robustness against net-
work assortativity. Four different link-to-node ratios
(LNR = 2,LNR = 3,LNR = 4,LNR = 5) are consid-
ered.
We now analyse how the network robustness of
the scale-free networks depend on each of the topo-
logical characteristics mentioned above. Our results
are illustrated in figures 1-6. In Fig. 1, we plot
the network robustness against network assortativity.
The figure shows that robustness tends to increase
with assortativity. This could be explained by the
fact that, high assortativity means similar nodes (in
terms of degrees) are connected together, including
the hubs. Therefore, compared to a non-assortative
scale-free network, the hubs in assortative scale-free
networks have ‘back-ups’, hence making it harder
for the network to be broken apart by targeted at-
tacks. Fig. 2 shows robustness against network mod-
ularity. We find that modularity again has positive
correlation with network robustness. Fig. 3 shows
robustness against clustering coefficient. It can be
seen that from Fig. 3 that these quantities are neg-
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Figure 2: Scale-free network robustness against net-
work modularity. Four different link-to-node ratios
(LNR = 2,LNR = 3,LNR = 4,LNR = 5) are consid-
ered.
atively correlated, with higher clustering coefficient
resulting in low robustness. While this may seem
counter-intuitive, it could be explained by the fact
that the more clustering a network has, the less pro-
portion of the links will be between distant parts of
the network (this also explains the negative correla-
tion usually observed between clustering coefficient
and average path length), and as such, the network
could be broken apart into components easily. While
these components themselves will be quite robust to
further attacks, the early disintegration means the ro-
bustness coefficient will be small for scale-free net-
works with high clustering.
Fig. 4 shows network robustness against average
path length. As expected (and explained above) there
is positive correlation between average path length
and network robustness. In Fig. 5 we show net-
work robustness against scale-free exponent. We see
that the correlation pattern varies here. While it is
well known that scale-free networks are more vul-
nerable to targeted attacks compared to random net-
works [10], let us point out that the scale-free expo-
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Figure 3: Scale-free network robustness against net-
work clustering coefficient. Four different link-to-
node ratios (LNR = 2,LNR = 3,LNR = 4,LNR = 5)
are considered.
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Figure 4: Scale-free network robustness against net-
work average path length. Four different link-to-
node ratios (LNR = 2,LNR = 3,LNR = 4,LNR = 5)
are considered.
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(a) Rich−Club−T hreshold = 5%
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(b) Rich−Club−T hreshold = 10%
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(c) Rich−Club−T hreshold = 15%
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(d) Rich−Club−T hreshold = 20%
Figure 6: Scale-free network robustness against network rich-club coefficients. Four different link-to-node
ratios (LNR = 2,LNR = 3,LNR = 4,LNR = 5) are considered.
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Figure 5: Scale-free network robustness against net-
work scale-free exponent. Four different link-to-
node ratios (LNR = 2,LNR = 3,LNR = 4,LNR = 5)
are considered.
Table 1: Pearson correlation coefficients between the
different network properties considered and the ro-
bustness coefficient values. Scale-free networks with
four different link-to-node ratios (LNR) were consid-
ered.
LNR = 2 3 4 5
Assortativity 0.86 0.95 0.90 0.92
Modularity 0.70 0.70 0.58 0.70
Clustering Coefficient -0.59 -0.80 -0.76 -0.75
Average Path Length 0.76 0.90 0.84 0.83
Scale-free Exponent (γ) 0.71 0.28 -0.55 -0.70
Rich Club Coefficient
5% 0.32 -0.18 0.35 0.18
10% 0.40 -0.11 0.27 -0.25
15% -0.39 -0.31 -0.14 0.07
20% -0.43 -0.24 0.04 0.11
nent is not a measure of the scale-freeness of a net-
work. Therefore, the networks with high scale-free
exponents are not necessarily more scale-free than
those with lower scale-free exponents. Indeed, we
found that in the networks we simulated, there was
a correlation between the squared error of fitting a
scale-free exponent to a network, and the exponent
itself, which means that the higher the scale-free ex-
ponent, the less the scale-free characteristic of a net-
work (though the error in all cases was small enough
to justify the network being identified as scale-free).
We also considered the rich-club profiles of each
of the scale-free networks we generated. Since the
rich-club profile is not a single quantity, we consid-
ered the rich-club coefficient of the network at four
percentile values, namely 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%
(for example, a 5% rich-club coefficient meant that
the sub-network consisting of the top 5% nodes (in
terms of degrees) was considered to calculate the rich
club.). However, as Fig. 6 shows, the rich-club phe-
nomena does not seem to affect the robustness of net-
works. It may be the case that smaller rich-clubs
have an effect on network robustness, and a more
detailed study exploring the whole rich-club profile
of each network is necessary to determine the exact
effect of rich-clubs on network robustness. Such a
study is beyond the scope of this exploratory paper.
Table 1 summarises the results mentioned above by
showing the quantitative Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients between each topological property and the ro-
bustness coefficient, for the hundred networks that
we studied. In most cases, we considered values
greater than 0.5, to be significant correlations.
Now let us turn out attention to small-world net-
works. Our results are summarised in Table 2. Fur-
thermore, the figures 7, 8 and 9 represent the vari-
ation of clustering coefficient, average path length
and modularity against the robustness of small-world
networks. These figures and table depict a positive
correlation between the robustness coefficient and all
9
topological properties considered. What is mainly
interesting here is that here the clustering coefficient
too, is positively correlated with network robustness
(compare Fig. 7 with Fig. 3).
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Figure 7: Small-world network robustness against
network clustering coefficient. Four different link-
to-node ratios (LNR = 2,LNR = 3,LNR = 4,LNR =
5) are considered. Contrast with Fig. 3.
Finally, we considered Erdos- renyi random net-
works. In comparison, the robustness of random net-
works do not show any significant correlation with
the network properties considered. The figure 10
shows, for example, the variation of clustering co-
efficient with the network robustness. According
to the figure, there is no significant correlation be-
tween the two parameters. Table 3 summarises our
results for the correlation coefficients between the
network properties considered and robustness coeffi-
cient. Since the network is randomly linked, none of
the topological properties we considered showed sig-
nificant variation among various networks, and per-
haps for this reason, the correlations between these
properties and robustness were also mostly negligi-
ble.
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Figure 8: Small-world network robustness against
network average path length. Four different link-to-
node ratios (LNR = 2,LNR = 3,LNR = 4,LNR = 5)
are considered.
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Figure 9: Small-world network robustness against
network modularity. Four different link-to-node ra-
tios (LNR= 2,LNR= 3,LNR= 4,LNR= 5) are con-
sidered.
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Table 2: Pearson correlation coefficients between the
different network properties considered and the ro-
bustness coefficient values. Small-world networks
with four different link-to-node ratios (LNR) were
considered.
LNR=2 3 4 5
Assortativity 0.42 0.34 0.31 0.43
Modulatiry 0.78 0.93 0.95 0.95
Clustering Coefficient 0.82 0.94 0.92 0.92
Average Path Length 0.63 0.85 0.75 0.77
Rich Club Coefficient
5% 0.83 0.93 0.93 0.93
10% 0.82 0.87 0.89 0.92
15% 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.77
20% 0.65 0.78 0.63 0.60
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Figure 10: Random network robustness against net-
work clustering coefficient. Four different link-to-
node ratios (LNR = 2,LNR = 3,LNR = 4,LNR = 5)
are considered.
Table 3: Pearson correlation coefficients between
the different network properties considered and the
robustness coefficient values. Erdos-Renyi ran-
dom networks with four different link-to-node ratios
(LNR) were considered.
LNR=2 3 4 5
Assortativity 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.20
Modularity 0.05 -0.01 0.22 0.20
Clustering Coefficient 0.11 -0.09 0.05 0.22
Average Path Length -0.21 0.05 0.14 0.12
Rich Club Coefficient
5% -0.22 0.13 0.17 0.13
10% -0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.23
15% 0.09 -0.18 0.36 -0.02
20% 0.04 0.24 0.04 -0.02
4 Discussion
Let us now discuss a few implications and limitations
of our results with respect to the three types of net-
works that we analysed. Let us first consider scale-
free networks. According to the above results, assor-
tativity and the robustness coefficient show a clear
positive correlation in scale-free networks. Assor-
tativity is a measure of the similarity of the nodes
that are connected, in terms of the node degree [30].
Hence, this result implies that when there are more
connections among similar nodes, we can expect to
see a higher topological robustness in that particu-
lar network. However, let us note that most scale-
free networks we considered have positive assorta-
tivity. Those networks which were disassortative
were only marginally so. Therefore, it is difficult to
say whether the absolute value of assortativity has a
positive correlation with network robustness.
The next point to note is that modularity seems to
substantially influence network robustness in scale-
free networks. This is welcome from a network
designer’s point of view, since modular networks
could be designed, which would also increase the ro-
bustness of a network. Many evolved and synthe-
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sized networks in social and engineered systems are
modular[2]. Furthermore, in some systems such as
software networks, there is a need to design the net-
work as a modular network [27],[31]. The ‘func-
tional robustness’ of engineered systems also in-
creases, it has been shown, when the networks are
modular [32]. Therefore it is significant that modular
networks have high topological robustness as well.
As mentioned above, clustering coefficient tends
to have a negative correlation with average path
length, when an ensemble of scale-free networks is
considered [33]. Networks with relatively small av-
erage path length and high clustering correlation are
called small-world networks [1, 34]. Our results
show that the smaller the clustering coefficient is,
and the larger the average path length is, the higher
the robustness. This must mean that scale-free net-
works which also show the small-world property are
relatively not robust to sustained targeted attacks.
Just like scale-free networks which are not robust
to targeted attacks compared to random networks
[10, 25], many natural networks which are scale-free
and small-world also achieve their ‘small-worldness’
at the cost of robustness to sustained targeted attacks.
It is already known that scale-free networks are
more resilient to random node failures, compared
to random networks. That is, preferential mixing
is likely to increase network robustness. Preferen-
tial mixing indicates that the nodes that have higher
degrees have a higher probability of attracting new
links. Examples of such networks include scientific
collaboration networks and social networks. Such
networks generally demonstrate scale-free degree
distributions [1]. Note that random mixing does not
necessarily imply the topology itself is random (such
as an Erdos-Renyi network). Indeed, many scale-
free networks, both synthesized and real world, can
show near random mixing patterns [18, 19, 20, 9].
With that background in mind, we may evalu-
ate the correlation results between the scale-free ex-
ponent γ and the robustness coefficient. When the
link-to-node ratio increases, there’s a deviation of
the scale-free exponent from its commonly observed
window of 2 to 3 [1]. Moreover, the correlation be-
tween the scale-free exponent and robustness coef-
ficient transforms from positive to negative, as the
link-to-node ratio increases. This may suggest that
the scale-free nature of a network could have an
effect on the topological robustness of a network.
However, we failed to observe a strong correlation
between the scale-free exponent and the robustness
coefficient. This could be partly due to the fact that
we used a degree based attack to disintegrate the net-
work, instead of emulating random node failures.
Finally, we found that in our analysis there was
no correlation between rich-club tendencies and net-
work robustness. However, we need further analy-
sis to come to definitive conclusions here, since the
rich-club phenomena cannot be measured by a sin-
gle number, and is measured through a profile. Net-
works may show rich club phenomena at various per-
centile cut-offs, and we did not find that much vari-
ation among networks on the cut-offs we chose (5%,
10%, 15%, 20%). Therefore, further analysis may be
necessary to establish the influence of rich-club phe-
nomena on network robustness to targeted attacks.
In comparison, according to Table 2 the robust-
ness coefficient of small-world networks show high
correlation with all network parameters we consid-
ered, such as the clustering coefficient, average path
length, modularity and rich-club profile. A small-
world network is identified as a network, which has
relatively high clustering coefficient and relatively
low average path length. Also, let us note that
the Watts-Strogatz algorithm that we used produces
‘pure’ small-world networks, that do not necessarily
have scale-free characters. Thus, these results affirm
that the increase in average path length, which de-
creases the small-world behaviour, tends to increase
the robustness of a network. On the other hand, when
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the clustering behaviour increases, that too affects
the robustness in a positive manner. Even though
average path length and clustering coefficient have
opposing effects on the small-world nature of a net-
work, they both seem to have a positive influence on
robustness. Therefore, it is possible to ‘balance’ the
robustness of a network without losing the overall
small-world nature, if we are prepared to trade off
one of the small-world features (such as high cluster-
ing coefficient), for the other. Moreover, the fact that
modularity and the robustness seem to show high
correlation is desirable since modularity is a pre-
ferred design attribute in most designed networks,
as mentioned before. Therefore, by increasing the
modularity in a small-world netowrk, we can expect
to preserve, if not increase its robustness. It is impor-
tant to note that the correlations themselves increase
when the link to node ratio increases, that is when
the network gets more dense. It is also interesting
to note that unlike in the case of scale-free networks,
the rich club phenomena has a strong positive corre-
lation to network robustness.
The correlation of robustness of Erdos-Renyi ran-
dom networks and the network properties considered
is considerably low. This may be due to the fact that
the robustness coefficient values of the random net-
works considered did not have any considerable vari-
ation, due to the connections being random. Hence,
we could argue that the scale-free and small-world
network models introduce more predictability and
flexibility in designing a network for its robustness,
compared to random networks. This could be indeed
one of the reasons why both small-world and scale-
free networks are very prevalent [1, 2, 3, 5] in nature.
5 Summary
In this paper, we analysed the relationship of net-
work robustness (under sustained targeted attacks)
with a number of topological features in scale-free,
small-world and random networks. Using synthe-
sised networks, we considered topological charac-
teristics including assortativity, modularity, cluster-
ing coefficient, average path length, rich-club profile,
and scale-free exponent. We used a particular ro-
bustness measure designed to analyse resilience un-
der sustained targeted attacks to measure robustness.
We designed our attacks based on the order of node
degrees. We discussed the implications and limita-
tions of our results.
In the case of scale-free networks, we observed
substantial positive correlation between network ro-
bustness and assortativity, modularity, and average
path length in scale-free networks. Also, we ob-
served that the clustering coefficient has a nega-
tive correlation with the robustness of scale-free net-
works. We did not find that rich-club coefficients or
scale-free exponents affect the robustness of a scale-
free network in a significant manner. Among scale-
free networks, therefore, we observed that the co-
existence of small-world features (low average path
length and high clustering) hinder topological ro-
bustness.
With regard to small-world networks, however,
robustness coefficient showed high correlation with
clustering coefficient, average path length, modular-
ity, assortativity and rich-club profile. However, the
correlation strength with assortativity was relatively
weaker compared to the rest of the parameters. We
observed therefore, that high clustering increases ro-
bustness in smallworld networks yet decreases ro-
bustness in scale-free networks. In comparison, the
robustness coefficient Erdos-Renyi random networks
did not show any significant correlation with any of
the network parameters used. We discussed the im-
plications of our results for network design and syn-
thesis.
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